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THE ROLE OF THE ABUSE OF RIGHT
DOCTRINE IN JAPAN*
Kazuaki Sono** and Yasuhiro Fujioka***
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent case, Mitamura v. Suzuki,' the plaintiff
sought compensation for loss of enjoyment of sunshine and
obstruction of ventilation resulting from defendant's addition
of a second floor to his one-story house southern to the plain-
tiffs in a residential section. Deciding in favor of the plaintiff,
the Japanese Supreme Court stated:
In all cases a right must be exercised in such a fash-
ion that the result of the exercise remains within a scope
judged reasonable in the light of the prevailing social
conscience. When a conduct by one who purports to have
a right to do so fails to show social reasonableness and
when the consequential damages to others exceed the
limit which is generally supposed to be borne in the social
life, we must say that the exercise of the right is no
longer within its permissible scope. Thus, the person who
exercises his right in such a fashion shall be held liable
because his conduct constitutes an abuse of right.2
Nuisance was traditionally considered as primarily a
matter of tort. The basic provision in the Japanese Civil Code
for tort liability, article 709, provides: "A person who violates
intentionally or negligently the right of another shall com-
pensate for damages arising therefrom." Thus, for the exis-
tence of tort liability, four elements are required: an infringe-
ment of another's right (objective test), wilful intent or neg-
ligence (subjective test), damage, and causation. Since one of
the purposes of the law of tort is to protect legitimate in-
terests which emerged in the process of the development of
* This article has been prepared for the Louisiana Law Review to in-
troduce the peculiar nature of the role of the abuse of right doctrine in
Japan. Professor Fujioka's article, Kenri no ranyo ni kansuru ichi-oboegaki
(A memorandum on the abuse of rights) in HOKUDAI HOGAKU RONSHU, vol.
26, no. 2 (1975), forms a basis for this paper. But the composition and views
expressed herein are not necessarily identical because of the joint-work.
** Professor of Law, Hokkaido University, Sapporo.
*** Associate Professor of Law, Hokkaido University, Sapporo.
1. 26 Saiko Saibansho minji hanreishu. 1067 (Sup. Ct., June 27, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as Minshu].
2. Id. at 1069.
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society, the requirement of "an infringement of another's
right" has been construed as requiring illegality.3 And, this
illegality may be found in the relativity between the kind of
interest infringed and the manner of the infringement. 4 In
nuisance disputes, such as the Mitamura case, this relativity
test involves balancing legitimate interests which conflict. In
the Mitamura case, the owner's right to make use of his prop-
erty clashed with his neighbor's interest in enjoying sunshine
and air. The court certainly could have applied article 709 of
the Civil Code in solving the dispute, but the decision is
unique in that the court emphasized the abuse of right as a
basis for the plaintiff's recovery. Why did the court rely on
the abuse of right doctrine rather than on the traditional tort
theory? Are these two approaches really different?
Where one of the conflicting interests is classified as a
right (e.g., property ownership) and the other interest is not
(e.g., enjoyment of sunshine), adjustment involves a judgment
as to when the sufferer should no longer be expected to bear
the inconvenience arising from the other's exercise of a right.
This approach presumes that certain inconveniences should
be borne by others where one is exercising his right. For this
reason, the relativity test for establishing the "illegality" re-
quired for tort liability has another name when nuisance is
involved: i.e., the "acceptable limit of endurance" test.5 Only
where an invasion exceeds this limit is "illegality" estab-
lished. If an interest not traditionally classified as a right,
such as enjoyment of sunshine, could be elevated to the
status of a right (e.g., right to enjoy sunshine) would it enjoy
greater protection? Our answer is no.
This paper analyzes the function of the abuse of right
doctrine in the Japanese jurisprudence. Emphasis is placed
on the operation of the doctrine in the law of nuisance as
illustrative of the peculiar role of the doctrine in Japan.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ABUSE OF RIGHT"
DOCTRINE
The abuse of right doctrine emerged from reflection on
the absoluteness of a right which exercise is left entirely for
3. Suekawa, Kenri shingai-ron (On the infringement of rights), KENRI
SHINGAI To KENRI RANYO (Infringement of rights and abuse of rights) 263
(1970).
4. WAGATSUMA, JIMUKANRI FUTORITOKU FUHOKOI (Unsolicited man-
agement, unjust enrichment and tort) 125 (1937).
5. KATO, FUHO-I (Tort) 106 (1974).
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individuals: Qui iure suo utitur, nemini facit iniuriam.6 The
doctrine emphasizes that exercise of a right cannot be consid-
ered in isolation of the interest of others who might be af-
fected thereby, because the notion of a "right" serves only as
a tool for regulating individual relationships in the society.7
The doctrine is now expressly prescribed in article 1(3) of the
Japanese Civil Code, which was incorporated at the time of
the revision of the Code in 1947. Article 1 reads: "(1) A private
right shall conform to the public welfare; (2) The exercise of
right and performance of duties shall be conducted in good
faith and sincerity; (3) No abuse of rights shall be permitted."
It is important to note that the doctrine constitutes only a
part of article 1. No direct answer has yet been given in the
Japanese jurisprudence as to whether the other provisions in
article 1, particularly paragraph (1) concerning the public
welfare, have independent roles or are only subsidiary in
support of the abuse of right doctrine. 8 Nevertheless the pub-
lic welfare notion, which is provided as inherently restrictive
of a private right, might influence some judges in evaluating
the meaning of the abuse of right doctrine in article 1 (3),
since the abuse of right doctrine is directed toward the ad-
justment of conflicting private interests in the light of the
social life.
The abuse of right doctrine, however, was not new to the
Japanese jurisprudence even before it was expressly incorpo-
rated into the Civil Code in 1947. The Great Court of Cassa-
tion, a former body of the present Japanese Supreme Court,
was already providing room for the emergence of the doctrine
through its decisions. The influence of other civil law coun-
tries, especially France, which favorably treated the doctrine
of abuse of right as a means to solve the question of nuisance,
6. Suekawa, Kenri ranyo gaisetsu (General survey on the abuse of
rights), KENRI SHINGAi To KENIu RANYO 101 (1949).
7. Id. at 101-02.
8. See Okada's comment on Harajima, Mimp6 ni okeru "k6ky6 no
fukushi" gainen (Concept of public welfare in the civil law), 41 HORITSU JIHO
114 (no. 3) (1969). As to a view which gives an independent meaning to para-
graph (1), see Wagatsuma, Kokyo no fukushi shingisoku kenri ranyo sogo no
kankei (Mutual relationship among public welfare, the principle of good faith
and the abuse of right), 1 KENRI No RANYj 58 (1962) (The abuse of rights),
published in celebration of Professor Suekawa's 70th birthday. Some doubt if
the abuse of right doctrine and the principle of good faith were really distin-
guishable. See Kawashima, Kenri ranyo no imiron-teki kosatsu (A considera-
tion on the abuse of right), 1 KENRI No RANYo 147 (1962) (The abuse of
right"). See also text at note 44.
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provided grounds for the development of this doctrine in
Japan in the early 1900's.9
Judicial Decision During Taisho Era
Our examination of cases which affected the development
of the doctrine shall commence from the Taisho era (1912-
1925). In Tonomura v. Osaka Alkali Co.,10 the question in-
volved was the recoverability of the damages to agricultural
products caused by air pollution from the defendant's factory.
The defendant contended that he should not be held for dam-
ages because he had used all the equipment available to re-
duce the pollution. In rendering a decision in favor of the
defendant, the court relied on the traditional principle of neg-
ligence. The court said that the defendant was not negligent
because he was reasonably diligent in endeavoring to avoid
damages. The decision impliedly recognized that even an al-
legedly legitimate exercise of the right of ownership could
create tort liability if damage results to others due to the lack
of reasonable care in exercising the right. This decision may
initially appear to be simply an application of existing tort
law, but it provided an important basis for the next decision.
In Mori v. Tsumashika," a creditor in executing a court
decree which enabled him to remove the debtor's house from
his land, recklessly destroyed the house, making the remains
unfit for the debtor's use. In awarding damages in favor of
the debtor, the court still based its judgment in tort and did
not explicitly refer to the abuse of right doctrine. The court,
however, did state that in implementing any execution decree
granted by a court, the party was not free to exercise his
entitlement in the fashion he chose but was bound to proceed
"with a method recognizable to be proper within the boundary
of the Law.' 12
9. See Makino, Kenri no ranyo (The abuse of right), HORITsu Ni OKERU
SHINKA To SHIMPO (Evolution and progress in the field of law) 223 (1924). In
addition to his recognition of the French influence, it is also interesting to
observe that he also stated: "As a thought of collectivism has gradually pre-
vailed over the individualism..., we might say that the rise of the abuse of
right doctrine was an inevitable result due to the reflection on the reality of
modern life which was experiencing great changes." Id. at 237.
10. 22 Daishin'in minji hanketsuroku 2474 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 22, 1916) [here-
inafter cited as Minroku].
11. 23 Minroku 14 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 22, 1917).
12. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
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Then came Shimizu v. Japan,13 a leading case in the de-
velopment of the abuse of right doctrine. In this case, a pine
tree of good lineage which had been located adjacent to a
switchyard near a National Railway station died because of
smoke emerging from trains. The judgment was against the
National Railway. After citing Mori v. Tsumashika, supra,
the court stated that the conduct of the railway in emitting
smoke over the tree went beyond the scope socially acceptable,
even though it was a by-product of a business which was
otherwise legitimate. After finding that the amount of smoke
at the location was far greater than other places along the
line, the court pointed out that the railway could have either
selected a different location for the switchyard or could have
erected a wall by the tree to prevent its death.
These three cases have relevancy for the development of
the abuse of right doctrine in the Japanese jurisprudence
even though the questions involved could have been solved
through the application of the law of negligence in tort. It
must be noted that the notion of the absolute nature of a
right, including the absolute legitimacy of its exercise, had a
much stronger hold in those days, and the introduction of a
new test for the restriction of the exercise of a right such as
"propriety within the boundary of the law" or "the socially
acceptable scope" was unique.
Judicial Decisions During the First Half of Showa Era
The Showa era (1926- ) brought a new type of case
which denied the absoluteness of ownership in a more direct
fashion. These cases involved disputes wherein the plaintiff,
an owner of land, was a victim of trespass, and the relief
sought by the landowner-removal of the trespass-was de-
nied. One case, Shinagawa v. Kurobe Railway Co., 14 involved a
controversy where the owner of land complained that the de-
fendant maintained a pipeline deep under his ground without
permission. The pipeline had been constructed before he be-
came the owner of the land and it was necessary for the de-
fendant to draw hot water from a near-by spring for operat-
ing a resort business. The plaintiff claimed that the pipeline
should be removed from his land. The area in question, how-
13. 25 Minroku 356 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 3, 1919).




ever, was only a very small fraction of the plaintiffs land.
The land was a waste one, left unused. Moreover, it appeared
that the plaintiff purchased the land from the previous owner
in consideration of a very small sum of money, requested the
defendant to purchase the land at an extremely high price,
and then brought this suit upon failure of the attempt to
conclude that profitable sale. In rejecting the plaintiff's
claim, the court balanced the substantive interests of the
parties involved and declared that the plaintiff had no sub-
stantial interest in obtaining the removal of the pipe from his
land. According to the court, the plaintiff s claim, based on his
property right, should not be granted because it constituted
an abuse of right by exceeding the permissible scope for the
exercise of the property right in view of the prevailing social
norm.
This decision, if broadly interpreted, provided a theoreti-
cal basis for giving priority to a business activity affecting
the public over the individual property right. The following
two cases might appear to have adopted this hypothesis. In
Fujita v. Tokyo Electric Co.,15 an electric company con-
structed, without permission, a waterpipe 30 feet deep under
the plaintiffs land, the surface of which he used for taking
certain rock material. Denying the plaintiffs request to have
the pipe removed from the land, the court said that the cost of
removing the waterpipe would be extraordinary as compared
to the damages suffered by the plaintiff, and emphasized the
public nature of an electric power plant. In Arimitsu v. Kochi
Railway Co.,16 part of the plaintiffs hilly pine-land close to the
sea-shore was adjacent to the construction site of a railroad,
and was reshaped when the railway company cut down trees
and filled slopes with soil. Despite the plaintiffs persistent
complaints, the railway company did this to make the con-
struction of the railroad on the company's land easier and the
company did finish construction of the line. Denying the claim
by the plaintiff for restoration of the land to the original
shape, the court first found that the requested restoration, if
implemented, would cause serious difficulty for the safe oper-
ation of the railroad because of the peculiar character of the
section. The court also found that the plaintiff had not used
the land and that the plaintiffs interest would not in fact be
15. 3511 Horitsu Shimbun 14 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 20, 1932).
16. 17 Dai-Minshfi 2057, 2065-67 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 26, 1938).
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much affected by keeping the land without restoration. The
court, emphasizing the public character of the railroad, found
that the plaintiffs request, based on his ownership of the
land, constituted an abuse of right. It must be noted, how-
ever, in both cases, the court stated that it was deciding only
on the requested relief and implied that if the suits had been
brought for the recovery of damages, the decision might have
been different. 17
Development After the Incorporation of the Doctrine in the
Civil Code
How have the courts proceeded after the abuse of right
doctrine was expressly incorporated in the Civil Code in 1947?
The generality in provision of the doctrine in article 1(3) of
the Civil Code would permit judges flexible approaches to
concrete disputes. The rigidity of other legal rules would no
longer be a barrier for a judge where he wished to avoid an
undesirable result arising from the strict application of such
other rules of law. On the other hand, the free hand given to
courts through this general provision might make a judge a
sole arbiter of disputes according to his own standards.'8 The
difficult question in applying such a general provision is how
to achieve some flexibility in the resolution of individual dis-
putes while retaining a desired legal stability or predictabil-
ity.'9 So far the Japanese courts refrained from an unduly
17. In this connection, it may be noted that the court, in Fujita v. Tokyo
Electric Co., in rejecting the removal of the pipe-line, emphasized that the
removal was economically impossible. Under the Anglo-American system this
issue may be considered as a question whether the equitable remedy should
be granted as contrasted to the ordinary common law remedy of damages.
But in Japan the selection of remedies between damages or specific perfor-
mance (or both) is plaintiff's decision. Neither of the two remedies is an
exception to the other. But cf. text at note 61.
18. Yoshimi, Shingisoku no kin6 ni tsuite (Concerning the function of the
principle of good faith), 47 HITOTSUBASHI RONSO 73-75 (no. 2) (1962).
19. The function of general clauses in formulating new rules of law to fill
the lack of specific rules in the Code is closely connected with the relationship
between judiciary and legislature. As to how scholars treat this question, see
M. Ishida, Seiteiho no kosokuryoku (Binding force of statutes), 550 JURISTO 18
(1973); M. Ishida, Hokaishaku hobo no kiso riron (1) (Fundamental theory
concerning methodology on the interpretation of law), 92 HOGAKu KYOKAI
ZASSIH 65 (1975); Kurusu, H6 no kaishaku ni okeru seiteiho no igi (The place of
a statute in the application of law by the judiciary), 73 HOGAKU KY6KAI
ZASSHI 1 (no. 2) (1956). As to the possible danger of an abusive use of general
clauses, see Igarashi, Nachisu hanrei ni okeru ippan joko no kinoJ-Rthers
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extensive use of article 1(3). The Japanese judiciary has
proved conservative regarding use of this general provision,
as contrasted to a relatively progressive attitude of
academia. 20 The judge's attitude is, of course, partly due to
their understandable reluctance to resort to a general provi-
sion where a dispute, however complicated, could be handled
by maneuvering within the realm of interpretation of con-
crete rules provided elsewhere in the Code. The number of
cases wherein the abuse of right doctrine is applied did not
notably increase after incorporation of the doctrine into the
Code. The courts have relied on the abuse of right doctrine
only in exceptional cases where no other alternative could
bring about a fair solution of a dispute. This attitude is a
sound one.21
The recent Mitamura case, involving an exercise of the
right of ownership which disturbed another landowner's en-
joyment of sunshine has already been noted. A similar ap-
proach was used in solving a dispute where digging for the
purpose of obtaining a hot spring on one person's land af-
fected another's enjoyment of a hot spring already in use in a
nearby area.22 The abuse of right doctrine was also applied to
a situation similar to Mori v. Tsumashika,23 involving en-
forcement of a compulsory execution decree. 24 In addition to
these classic ones, other types of disputes are also notewor-
thy.
According to article 612 (2) of the Civil Code, subletting of
a leasehold by a tenant without the landlord's permission
constitutes a ground for rescission by the landlord. However,
several lower courts have refused in certain cases to give
no 8hosetau ni t8uite (Function of general clauses which appeared in judicial
cases during the Nazi period-Comments on the Riithers' view), 2 ISOMURA
(ed.), MIMPOGAKU No KIso TEKI KADAI (Fundamental subjects of the civil
law) 39, 61, 68 (1974) published in celebration of Professor Obo's 60th birthday
[hereinafter cited as Igarashi].
20. Igarashi, Hanrei ripp6 to minji saiban (Judicial precedents, legisla-
tion and civil cases), 201 HANREI TAIMUzu 27-28 (1967). Contra, Yoshimi,
Mimpo hanrei to Saikosaibansho (Civil cases and the Supreme Court), 42
HORITSU JIH5 40-41 (1970).
21. Accord, Igarashi, 8upra note 19.
22. Daimaru Besso Co. v. Takeishi, 12 Minshu 1640 (Sup. Ct., July 1,
1958).
23. 23 Minroka 14 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 22, 1917).
24. Cf. Kangyo Fukushi Co. v. Kawamata Hunkin Kogyo Co., 24 Minshu
509 (Sup. Ct., June 11, 1970); Okada v. Nakajima, 22 Minshu 1862 (Sup. Ct,
Sept. 6, 1968); Nakahara v. Motogi, 16 Minshu 1157 (Sup. Ct., May 24, 1962).
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effect to such a rescission, basing their refusal on article 1 (3).
The Japanese Supreme Court, while exhibiting some reluc-
tance to rely on this general provision, sustained those deci-
sions. 25 In doing so, the Court stated in Uchino v. Kobayashi26
that termination of a landlord-tenant relationship was not
justified merely because conduct of the tenant formerly con-
stituted ground for rescission under article 612 (2), unless the
relationship became such that the landlord could no longer
have faith in leaving his property to the tenant. The Court
thus avoided a rigid application of article 612 (2). In a series of
decisions where the occupancy of a leasehold tenant was pro-
tected even after the title for the subject property had been
transferred by the landlord to another party, the courts re-
fused the new owner's request that the tenant evacuate the
leased property because the transferee lacked legitimate
practical interests. 27 It is important to note, however, that
the period when these decisions were rendered was after
World War II when the shortage of houses was very keen, and
that the legislature had been active to strengthen the ten-
ants' position through the enactment of a landlord-tenant
statute.
Matsumoto v. Japan,28 the so-called Itatsuke Air Base
case, illustrates another type of dispute where the doctrine
becomes applicable. In that case the Japanese Government
had a lease of land from a citizen for use by the American Air
Force in accordance with an administrative arrangement be-
tween the two Governments. The government rejected the
landlord's claim for return of the land on expiration of the
lease. The court sustained the government's contention that
the citizen's assertion of reclamation constituted an abuse of
25. See, e.g., Kawaguchi v. Mizunoya, 24 Minshu 2015 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 11,
1970); Chinzai v. Iwakuni, 10 Minshu 475 (Sup. Ct., May 8, 1956); Endo v.
Kyoto Daiichi Shingu Seizo Shisetsu Kumiai, 9 Minshu 1294 (Sup. Ct., Sept.
22, 1955); Uchino v. Kobayashi, 7 Minshu 979 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 25, 1953). It may
be noted, that in some situations the court did direct itself positively to the
question of the applicability of the general provision. But in those instances
the court's conclusions were negative in granting remedies. But see Ochi v.
Yamano, 26 Minshu 1015 (Sup. Ct., June 15, 1972). See, e.g., Ishikawa v.
Morimoto, 10 Minshu 1581 (Sup. Ct., December 20, 1956); Ishikawa v.
Nashimoto, 7 Minshu 116 (Sup. Ct., January 30, 1953).
26. 7 Minshu 979 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 25, 1953).
27. Maruyama v. Ikejima, 22 Minshu 1767, 1817 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 3, 1968);
Sunahata Seikan Kogyosho Co. v. Tominaga, 17 Minshu 639 (Sup. Ct., May 24,
1963).
28. 19 Minshu 233 (Sup. Ct, Mar. 9, 1965).
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right. The court stressed that the basis of the protection of a
private right by law lies in its social and public utility. The
repossession sought by the landlord would have created a
serious problem for the maintenance of the air base, and the
court felt that repossession would not give the landowner
greater protection of his right. In passing, it may be noted
that the motive of the plaintiff in bringing this suit was
rather political.
Obonai v. Orizume Sangyo Co. 29 exemplifies still another
type of dispute. Performance of a contract declared null and
void because it contradicted with an administrative regula-
tion was to be regarded as retroactively illegal where the
performance had taken place, before the nullity became
known to the parties. In such a case, a party to that invalid
contract might wish to take advantage of its nullity, assert-
ing that the execution under the contract constituted a torti-
ous wrong. This case, however, denied a claim for damages
based on this theory. The court said that such a claim for
damages could constitute an abuse of right.
III. THE FUNCTION OF THE ABUSE OF RIGHT DOCTRINE
Various institutions or concepts contained in the Civil
Code have a deep connection with the social and economic life
prevailing at the time they were conceived. The Code, how-
ever, remains static. The abuse of right doctrine enables
courts to adjust their contents to changes in society.
Judicial precedents applying the abuse of right doctrine
may be divided into three categories.30 The first group are
those imposing tort liability for abusive exercises of rights
which exceed socially acceptable standards, as in Mori v.
Tsumashika3 1 and Shimizu v. Japan.3 2 In this group of cases,
the doctrine was used to articulate the scope of a right. The
issue was the scope of a right which was stated in general
terms; the abuse of right doctrine operated as a tool infinding
that scope.33 This is a supplementary function of the doctrine.
It is also a creative one in that the doctrine provides room for
29. 19 Minshu 2212 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 21, 1965).
30. See Suzuki, Zaisanh5 ni okeru kenri rany5 riron no kin6 (The function
of the abuse of right doctrine in the property law), 30 HRITSU JIHo 16 (no.
10) (1958) [hereinafter cited as Suzuki].
31. 23 Minroku 14 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 22, 1917).
32. 25 Minroku 356 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 3, 1919).
33. Suzuki at 17-18. The same philosophy may be found in the French
expression, le droit cesse ou l'abus commence.
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the judiciary to pronounce more detailed rules with regard to
a right prescribed in the code in general terms.
The second group of cases are those which narrow or re-
strictively modify the scope of a right which has been ex-
pressly prescribed to exist in a specific form.34 Civil Code arti-
cle 612 (2) expressly entitles the lessor to rescind a lease when
the lessee sublet the object without the lessor's permission.
But execution of this entitlement may be restricted under
certain circumstances. Here, the abuse of right doctrine pro-
vides a basis to modify the scope of existing statutes.3 5 The
judiciary's role in implementing certain social policies would
be illustrated most vividly in this type of case.
The third group includes those cases where courts
employed the doctrine to accomplish a compulsory concilia-
tion. For example, in both Shinagawa v. Kurobe Railway Co.36
and Fujita v. Tokyo Electric Co., 37 the court stated that a
claim by the landowner against a third party to clear inva-
sion on his land constituted an abuse of right, although the
third party had no legitimate interest at all on the claimant's
land. While this approach clearly contradicts with the tradi-
tional approach within the civil law, no solution could be at-
tained in this type of case without resort to the abuse of
right doctrine, even if the approach hurts a sound legal mind
when considered apart from a concrete dispute.38 The cases
illustrate an equity function of the doctrine.
What role, then, has the abuse of right doctrine played in
the field of nuisance, which is deeply linked to neighborhood
relationships? Those parts of the civil code which regulate
property rights and the neighborhood relationships lack con-
crete provisions on nuisance. Our hypothesis is that the doc-
trine has been utilized to create laws in the field of nuisance
due to the lack of concrete rules on nuisance in the Civil
Code, 39 in order to prescribe definitely the exercisable scope of
34. See also 709 HANREI JIH 56 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 5, 1972); lida v. Ohshio, 1
Kaminshu 996 (Kobe D. Ct., June 26, 1950); Noguchi v. Yamashita, 1 Kaminshu
845 (Tokyo D. Ct., May 31, 1950). See, e.g., Ohta v. Kamei, 1 Kakyu saibansho
minji hanreishu 532 (Fukuoka High Ct. April 10, 1950) [hereinafter cited as
Kaminshu].
35. Suzuki at 18-20.
36. 14 Dai-Minshu 1965 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 1935).
37. 3511 Horitsu Shimbun 14 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 20, 1932).
38. Suzuki at 20-22.
39. See also Harajima, Mimpo ni okeru kokyo no fukushi gainen (Concep-
tion of public welfare in civil law), JAPAN SOC'Y OF SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (ed.),




existing rights. The importance of identifying concrete rules
in this field is becoming evident, because the expansion of city
life and industrial developments, unknown at the time of cod-
ification of the Civil Code, emphasize the need to readjust
neighborhood relationships. The life of the abuse of right doc-
trine lies in the adjustment of conflicting interests in a
changing society.
A recent study, however, indicates that most nuisance
cases are solved through the application of other rules and
not through direct application of the abuse of right doctrine.
The study also states that while the abuse of right doctrine
serves as an indirect guide for judges in applying concrete
rules, the doctrine was not essential in arriving at decisions.40
The change in emphasis from the right-oriented Schikane ap-
proach to the balance-of-interests approach in the modern
jurisprudence may already have obscured the importance of
the abuse of right doctrine since the balance-of-interests ap-
proach can handle many difficult problems by way of flexible
interpretation of a concrete rule even without the aid of the
doctrine. However, it was the philosophy underlying the
abuse of right doctrine which gave impetus for the switch in
approach in modern jurisprudence. The emergence of the
"acceptable limit of endurance" as the test for finding tort
liability in nuisance cases is a good example. Our appreciation
of impact of the abuse of right doctrine should not be based
solely on those cases where it is expressly employed.
Japanese courts emphasize abusive exercise of a right in
connection with the public welfare, as exemplified by
Shinagawa v. Kurobe Railway Co. 4 1 The Civil Code now incor-
porates these two notions in the same provision, article 1.42
Many scholars indicate concern that the otherwise proper
exercise of a private right might be unduly suppressed in the
name of the public or social character of a conflicting right.43
Link with the public welfare might also provide a basis for
40. Higashi, Kogai to kenri ranyo ron (Nuisance and the abuse of right
doctrine), 294 HANREI TAiMuzu 2, 6, 7, 9 (1973).
41. 14 Dai-Minshu 1965 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 1935).
42. See discussion supra, note 8.
43. See, e.g., Kaino, Kenri ranyo to kokyo no fukushi (The abuse of right
and public welfare) 30 HORITSU JIHO 4 (no. 10) (1958); Matsumoto, Wagakuni
ni okeru kenri rany6 riron no tokushitsu ni tsuite no ichi-ktsatsu (On a
characteristic of the abuse of right doctrine in Japan), 9 HOGAKU RONSHU
(Kansai University) 81 (No. 5.6) (1960). Compare the text following Shinagawa
v. Kurobe Railway Co. supra, note 14, where two examples are illustrated to
show that such a fear appeared to have materialized.
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the judiciary to create a new social structure of ownership."
Thus, many are skeptical of the utility of the abuse of right
doctrine where the public welfare notion is emphasized. How-
ever, even those scholars opposed to use of the doctrine in
that connection do not necessarily oppose application of the
abuse of right doctrine to the field of nuisance. The doctrine's
function in creating laws of nuisance is acceptable to one
commentator because the doctrine adjusts conflicting in-
terests of the same dimension. Exercise of a right would not
be suppressed for the protection of other properties but of
other citizens.4 5
IV. CREATING NUISANCE LAWS
The drafters of the Japanese Civil Code were probably
aware that nuisance disputes might become common due to
the modernization of industries. No provision was included in
the Civil Code section relating to the neighborhood relation-
ship so that regulation could be left to administrative laws;46
from the beginning of the Code, specific rules were lacking
with regard to nuisance. According to the prevailing view,
compensation for damages due to. nuisance must be sought
within the framework of the law of tort, in particular by re-
sort to Civil Code article 709, the general provision providing
for tort liability.47 In case of nuisance, the question whether
an alleged tortfeasor had abused his right is asked in terms
of whether illegality can be found in the light of the accepta-
ble limit of endurance, which is a test of relativity for nui-
sance disputes. And, so long as illegality may be determined
relatively, reference to the abuse of right doctrine may no
longer be necessary. 4 However, since the abuse of right doc-
44. Harajima at 26.
45. Id. at 20. See also Isomura, Schikane kinshi yori kyakkanteki rieki
koryo eno hatten (The development from the Schikane approach to the objec-
tive balancing of interests), 1 KENRI No RANYO (1972) (The abuse of right).
46. The original version of the Civil Code, which had never been enforced
after its proclamation in 1890 but replaced by the 1898 version, had provided
in article 264 that the measures for the protection against nuisance be regu-
lated through administrative regulations. During the process to formulate
the 1898 version of the code, Mr. Ume, one of the drafters, commented that
provision was omitted from the new draft because it provided the matter of
course. 9 H6TEN CHOsAKAI Gi SOKKIROKU (Stenographic records of proceed-
ings of the parliamentary committee on the Civil Code) 59-60 (1894).
47. See text preceding note 4, supra.
48. Accord, Funahashi, ShoyZken no ranyo (Abuse of ownership), 1
KENRI No RANYO (The abuse of right) 25 (1962).
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trine has traditionally been viewed as a narrow exception to
the principle of free- exercise of a private right to be applied
only in extreme cases, emphasis was often necessary that a
nuisance consisted of an aggression on a personal interest of
the victim. In nuisance cases, most disputes arise as a conflict
between the exercise of a right by an aggressor and the claim
for protection by the aggressee of his interest. Both parties'
assertion of their interests are legitimate in the absence of
the conflict.49 Had it been clearly conceived in Shimizu v. Ja-
pan,50 an epoch-making decision for the development of the
abuse of right doctrine, that the court utilized the doctrine to
perform a legislative function, filling the gap in the Civil
Code, the law of nuisance may have developed earlier to for-
mulate a unique area of law which is distinct from a mere
tort.51
In nuisance disputes, the difficult task for the court is
where to draw the line between conflicting interests in order
to establish a criterion in finding the required illegality. A
good example, illustrating an operation of the relativity test
for the determination of the acceptable limit of endurance,
may be seen in Ishikawa v. Tokyo. 52 In sustaining the claim
for mental damages by neighboring inhabitants because of
noise from the construction of a metropolitan subway line,
the court stated: "However socially useful the noise-
producing conduct may be, it still could constitute a tort
where the noise was such as to exceed the limit within which
everyone was reasonably expected to bear in the pursuit of
social life. This was true even if the situation did not fall
within the category of cases where available technical
methods for reduction of noise had not been employed al-
though the adoption of such methods had been economically
feasible." Implicit in the decision was that the court consid-
ered, as an element in finding the illegality, whether reason-
able meaures to reduce the noise had been taken. However,
as already seen in Tonomura v. Osaka Alkali Co.,53 the tradi-
tional court's attitude was to regard this question as a factor
in finding negligence, not illegality. Such confusion between
49. SAWAI, KO5GAI No SHIHOTEKI KENKYU (Studies on private law as-
pects of nuisance) 355 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SAWAI].
50. 25 Minroka 356 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 3, 1919).
51. See Harajima at 19.
52. 15 Kaminshu 1591 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 22, 1964).
53. 22 Minroku 2474 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 22, 1916).
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the required two elements for tort liability may be observed
in many recent decisions.54 Some scholars regard this
phenomenon meaningful and postulate that courts are for-
mulating a new test in finding liability in nuisance cases-a
new endurance-limit theory. They advocate that the "accept-
able limit of endurance" as a test for finding liability in nui-
sance cases should be treated as a consolidation of the tradi-
tional requirements of illegality and negligence, and that
mere assertion and proof that a certain aggression had ex-
ceeded the acceptable limit should be sufficient to impose lia-
bility on the defendant. 55 This approach is, in effect, stepping
closer to a non-fault liability.56 A similar approach, which also
shows a sharp contrast to Tonomura v. Osaka Alkali Co., may
be observed in O-no v. Showa Denko Co. 57 This case concerned
a chemical plant which allegedly caused serious personal in-
juries to surrounding neighbors by pouring its chemical
waste into a river. The court, rendering decision against the
defendant chemical industry, stated in dictum that, where
dangers to human lives or bodies were foreseeable even with
the adoption of a top-level engineering technique in an effort
to prevent such dangers, the industry should either reduce
production or cease its operation.
Some assert that true protection of citizens from nui-
sance activities can be attained only through introduction of
a new legal institution based on non-fault liability.58 The new
endurance-limit theory interestingly tries to accomplish the
same result without special legislation. A modern trend to
switch subjective tests to objective ones in finding negligence
is laudable, 59 but it is submitted that a further switch from
negligence to non-fault liability is for the legislature. Should,
54. See, e.g., Nakayama v. Nihon Denshin Denwa Kosha, 459 HANREI
JIHO 60 (Tokyo D. Ct., Oct. 1, 1966); Tanabe v. Miyado Shoten Co., 398 HANREI
JIHO 48 (Nagoya D. Ct., Nov. 30, 1964); Hirose v. Nikkan Supotsu Insatsu Co.,
15 Koto saibansho minji hanreishu 363 (Tokyo High Ct., May 26, 1962).
55. See Awaji, Kogai ni okeru koi kashitsu to ihosei (Willful intention,
negligence and illegality in nuisance cases), 485 JURISTO 372 (1970); Professor
Nomura's view appearing in KATO (ED.), KOGAIHo No SEISEI To TENKAI (Cre-
ation of the law of nuisance and its development) at 400 (1968).
56. Shinomiya, K6gai shih5 no hatten ni tsuite (On the development of the
nuisance law as a private law), 610 SHdJI Ho-Mu KENKYu 8 (1972).
57. 642 HANREI JIHO 96 (Niigata D. Ct., Sept. 29, 1971).
58. See, e.g., SUEFURO, MIMPO ZAKXICH( (Collection of essays on the Civil
Law) 198, 323, 339 (1940).




then, the new trend in court decisions in the nuisance field be
accused as contrary to the Civil Code article 709, which re-
quires negligence as well as illegality for tort liability? In
considering this question, one must be reminded of the fact
that the drafters of the Civil Code intentionally omitted from
the Code any rule relating to nuisance, and that the abuse of
right doctrine has a function to create laws to supplement the
vacancy. Could the recent confusion in the law of torts with
regard to the requirements of illegality and negligence, par-
ticularly in relation to nuisance disputes, not have been
avoided if nuisance cases had been isolated from the traditional
tort law?60
A trend to employ different standards for endurance, de-
pendent upon whether remedies sought are for injunctions or
damages, is also a welcome one.61 Adoption of different stan-
dards would enable certain activities to continue at the cost
of damages while others could not. The law-creating function
of the abuse of right doctrine would, in this way, serve in
establishing relevant tests for the selection of appropriate
remedies in a given situation.
V. RECENT JUDICIAL ATTITUDE FOR THE PROTECTION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS
Identification of an acceptable limit of endurance in a
given situation establishes in turn an outer limit for the
exercise of a right. The net result is the emergence of in-
terests legitimately endorsed by courts as worthy of protec-
tion. Various interests have been recognized, through nui-
sance cases, as worthy of protection, defeating the alleged
legitimacy in the exercise of conflicting rights. Recognition of
such interests is a by-product of the law-creation by courts in
the field of nuisance. It would be natural, however, for such
an interest soon to seek recognition and judicial protection as
a right. The new terminology often heard recently, "the right
to enjoy environment" or "the environmental right" is a typi-
60. See KAWASHIMA, MIMPO I: SORON-BUKKEN (Civil law I: General re-
marks and real rights) 203 (1960), where he expresses that the compensation
for nuisance should not be regarded the same as the ordinary award of dam-
ages under the traditional law of tort.
61. See Ito, Sashitome seikyuken (Injunction), 5 GENDAI SONGAI
BAISH6H6 K6ZA (Lectures on the modern law of damages) 395, 407 (1973);
KATO (ED.), KOGAIH) No SEISEI To TENKAI (Creation of the law of nuisance
and its development) 13 (1968); SAWAi at 146.
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cal example. It may be that, where the self-sustaining scope
of such interest be clearly identified in a concrete form, the
traditional approach to resort to the acceptable limit of en-
durance test may be replaced by a more direct approach
wherein the parties endowed with such an environmental in-
terest claim the protection of their right against invasion.
The phrase "environmental right" was first used in Japan
by a study group of the Osaka Bar Association in 1970. They
defined the environmental right as a right for a person to
enjoy and control good environment. Such environment in-
cludes natural surroundings such as air, water, land, scenic
beauty, calmness and sunshine as well as various social as-
sets. Environmental assets are to be shared by all citizens
regardless of whether they have property rights. According
to the study group, the merit in identifying the environmen-
tal interest as a right lies in its power to dominate over the
environment thereby preventing its invasion.6 2
Examination of the following cases, however, discloses
that the environmental right has not obtained full legitimacy
in jurisprudence. But it is clear that the courts are treating
environmental interests as a more important element in the
consideration of disputes than in the past, and that they
realize that environmental interests can hardly be identified
on an individual basis, but must be recognized on a broader
basis.
These trends are evident in those cases involving dis-
putes related to the enjoyment of sunshine, particularly
where a conflict exists between a builder of a tall building and
the neighboring residents. In Hiroshima v. Tsubaki,63 for
example, the court granted an injunction to prohibit the con-
struction of a three-story apartment house in a residential
area developed by a railway company to accomodate private
houses. The court said that a residential environment, equip-
ped with adequate sunshine, proper ventilation of the air,
and decent scenery, was essential for the maintenance of a
healthy and pleasant life. Where, as in that case, an ideal resi-
dential environment had been maintained as a consequence
of a project aimed at development of a low-story residen-
tial area, the court felt the area should be accorded maximum
protection against the high-rising use of part of the area, which
62. OSAKA BENGOSHI KAI KANKYOKEN KENKY19KAI, KANKYOKEN (en-
vironmental rights) 78, 85-87 (1973).
63. 592 HANREI JIHO 41 (Itami Branch of Kobe D. Ct., Feb. 5, 1970).
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was inconsistent with its ideal residential environment. Thus,
the dispute was not a conflict between two individual property
owners but a conflict between assertion of a property right by
one owner and the interests shared by all the surrounding
neighbors. Recognition of such an interest would not have been
possible if the dispute related to individual properties. What is
unique in this decision is a positive recognition by the court of an
interest held by people as contrasted to a property right. A
similar approach was also employed in Ebara v. Kinki Nippon
Railway Co., 6 4 where construction to provide illumination
equipment to an already existing baseball stadium for night
games was restrained to maintain a quiet residential environ-
ment.
Two additional cases are Morishima v. Hanshin K4soku
D6ro K~dan6 5 and Ueda v. Japan.66 The former case involved
a request by citizens adjacent to a freeway construction area
that the construction cease; they claimed the construction
gave damages to the good neighborhood, particularly through
its noise, vibration, worsening of ventilation, lessening of
sunshine, and an electric wave disturbance affecting TVs.
The court, reluctant to recognize the existence of an en-
vironmental right as such, accomplished the same result by
protecting the environmental interest through award of dam-
ages to the complaining citizens and through its order to the
construction agency to refrain the continuance of the con-
struction unless certain preventive measures be adopted. In
Ueda, two hundred and sixty-four inhabitants living in the
crowded area surrounding a busy airport sought an injunc-
tion against the port authority prohibiting any night flight
between 9:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. The court prohibited night
flights after 10:00 p.m., but still showed hesitance in recogniz-
ing the environmental right as such and consequently re-
sorted to a traditional tort approach. But it is obvious that
the court's solution to the claim could be better com-
prehended if we conceive the existence of certain legitimate
interests shared by citizens in relation to the environment
and to decent treatment as human beings.
Indeed, the courts are becoming more aware of the im-
portance of identifying interests connected to maintenance of
64. 717 HANREI Jmi 23 (Osaka D. Ct., Oct. 13, 1973).
65. 702 HANREI JIHo 18 (Amagasaki Branch of Kobe D. Ct., May 11, 1973).
66. 729 HANREI JIHO 3 (Osaka D. Ct., Feb. 27, 1974).
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decent living, not as interests held individually, but on a
broader local scale. For example, in granting standing to sue,
the courts do not necessarily look at the interest of an indi-
vidual but the interest of the locality as a whole. 6 The recog-
nition by courts of the necessity to solve disputes of a local
nature on the locality basis seems to be an upward trend.68
The two cases, Kamikawa v. the Town of Yoshida69 and Fujih-
ara v. the City of Izumi, 70 which protected the interests of
neighboring residents by prohibiting construction of waste
disposal stations, are typical ones. The net result is a creation
of increasing difficulty for governmental authorities desiring
long range city planning.
VI. EPILOGUE
Why do plaintiffs in nuisance cases often insist on treat-
ing their environmental interest as a "right"? What practical
difference, if any, does the distinction between "environmen-
tal right" and "environmental interest" bring about? The real
intention of the advocates for the recognition of the environ-
mental rights seems to be based on their understanding that
the vesting of a "right" will give the protection of the envi-
ronment a stronger position, because a right is an exclusive
connotation by definition. According to them, an invasion of a
right establishes the existence of the requirement of illegality
which is necessary as a prerequisite for claiming damages; it
may also provide a stronger basis for obtaining an injunction
against conduct dangerous to the environment. The vesting
of a "right" will also make it no longer necessary to adopt the
passive approach in nuisance cases in finding protected en-
vironmental interests only as a consequence of application of
67. As a positive appreciation of this approach from the viewpoint of the
law of civil procedure, see Matsuura, Kankyoken shingai sashitome kari8ho-
bun 8osh5 ni okeru t~jisha tekikaku to gditsu kakutei no hitsuy5sei (The stand-
ing to sue and the required consistency in judgment with regard to all the
parties concerned in granting injunctions to protect environmental rights),
JITrAIHO To TETSUZUKIHO No KoSAKU (Relationship between the rules of
substance and those of procedure), published in celebration of Prof.
Yamakido's 60th birthday, 302 (1974).
68. For the positive appreciation of this trend, see Sawai, 70-nendai kogai
8ashitome 8aibanrei no ayumi (The new tendency of nuisance cases during
1970's), 541 JURISTo 84, 91 (1973).
69. 631 HANREI JIH6 24 (Hiroshima D. Ct., May 20, 1971).
70. 663 HANREI JIHO 80 (Kishiwada Branch of Osaka D. Ct., April 1, 1972).
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the acceptable limit of endurance test because, as a right, its
content could be positively defined .71
However, the wisdom of recognizing an environmental
right has been seriously questioned, since it might negate the
balancing of interests which was indispensable in the consider-
ation of nuisance disputes. 72 This criticism seems to be justified.
We have already noted that the accumulation of judicial deci-
sions in nuisance disputes gradually enabled the identification
of various interests which the courts desired to protect. The
more clearly identified an interest becomes, the holder of such
interest is more apt to assert it positively. Once identification of
protected interests has been made, the originally passive
character of such interests, as only defenses for the purpose of
drawing lines in the operation of the acceptable limit of endur-
ance test, tends to be forgotten. Such an interest would gradu-
ally assert its own existence as such. However, what would
happen if advocates for recognition of an environmental right
insist on its absolute scope? Are they ready to accept applica-
tion of the abuse of right doctrine to the assertion of an
environmental right when its assertion goes to an extreme?
The nuisance disputes are products of social life where
the legitimacy of exercising conflicting interests is questioned
by opposing parties. The adequate solution of nuisance cases
depends on each peculiar circumstances. In this field utmost
flexibility must be provided. Advocates of an environmental
right seem to be merely shifting the pendulum to the other
end. The law-making function of the abuse of right doctrine,
through the accumulation of cases, has brought the recogni-
tion of certain environmental interests worthy of protection
against allegedly legitimate exercises of a right. This was
possible only through the balancing of conflicting interests in
each concrete case. Why do those benefited by denial of the
absoluteness of a "right" of an aggressor now insist on a right
rather than content themselves with a judicially protected
interest?73 If the intent of the advocates of such a right is
71. See OSAKA BENGOSHI KAI KANKY&KEN KENKYUJKAI, KANKY5KEN 87,
100, 109 (1973).
72. Kato, Kanky6ken no gainen o megutte (Concerning a concept of the
environmental right), MIMPO NI OKERU RONRI To RIEKI KORYo (Logic and
balancing of interests in the civil law) 121 (1972); Yabu, Nie8h5 no shih6 teki
hogo ni kansuru shomondai (Several problems concerning the protection of
sunshine under the civil law), 25 HOKUDAI HOGAKU RONSHU 19 (no. 3) (1974).
73. See, Fujioka, Sashitome no uttae ni kansuru kenkyft josetsu (On in-
junctionary relief by courts), 21 HOKUDAI HOGAKU RONSHIU 109-112, 175,
180-83 (1970).
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merely for a continued or better protection of their environ-
ment by courts, it would do no harm. But if their desire for
recognition of an environmental right is motivated by a de-
sire for absolute protection of the interest, making possible
claims by others that the environmental right has itself been
abused, they are opening a door for recycling of the history of
the abuse of right doctrine from the other end. The abstract
battle of conflicting rights based on absoluteness of a "right"
should be avoided. The peculiar issue in nuisance cases
should remain how and where to draw a line between conflict-
ing interests in concrete situations. The abuse of right doc-
trine has certainly heretofore played an important role in
establishing a necessary test to this end. A new situation
where the function of this abuse of right doctrine might be
abused need not be created if we continue to balance conflict-
ing interests through concrete cases.
